Submitted Papers

“Redistribution with Performance Pay” [Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Political Economy, April 2022]
with Pawel Doligalski and Nicolas Werquin.

Abstract: Half of the jobs in the U.S. feature pay-for-performance. We derive novel incidence and optimal nonlinear tax formulas for the overall rate of progressivity and for the top tax rates on total earnings and bonuses when such labor contracts arise from moral hazard frictions within firms. Optimal taxes account for the fiscal externalities and welfare consequences of two distinct forces: a direct crowding-out of private insurance and a countervailing crowding-in due to endogenous labor effort responses. These imply that the amount of pre-tax earnings risk to which the worker is exposed is roughly invariant to tax progressivity, whereas the (adverse) welfare consequences of the crowd-out outweigh those of the crowd-in. Quantitatively, the optimal tax policy with performance-pay contracts is close to that prescribed by standard models that treat earnings risk as exogenous. Finally, we uncover an efficiency-based argument for taxing bonuses at strictly lower rates than base earnings.

Appendix | VMACS WP Presentation

Papers under Revision

“Flexible Retirement and Optimal Taxation” [Reject & Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2020]

Abstract: This paper studies optimal insurance against idiosyncratic wage shocks in a life cycle model with intensive labor supply and endogenous retirement. When the fixed cost of work is increasing in wage, the optimal retirement wedge provides stronger incentives for delayed retirement with age. Retirement benefits that resemble the US Social Security system can implement the optimum. Calibrated numerical simulations suggest that a mix of retirement benefits that increase with claiming age, and age-dependent linear taxes, is close to optimal.

Online Analytic Appendix | Online Computational Appendix
Chicago Fed WP, No 2018-18, 2018 version

Work in Progress

"Bonus Question: How Does Incentive Pay Affect Unemployment Dynamics?" (slides available upon request)
with John Grigsby and Jonaton Hazell

"Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Developing Countries: Theory and Evidence from Senegal" (draft available upon request)
with Abdoulaye Cisse, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Ahmadou A. Mbaye